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Supreme Court Relaxes Standard for Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases

In an April, 2024 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered an opinion setting forth the standard a plaintiff must meet to sustain a violation of Title VII on the basis of sex.  The case of Muldrow v. St. Louis involved a female officer (Muldrow) who had been employed in the police force’s Intelligence Division for nine years.  Her superior approached her and asked her to agree to a transfer out of that position, to be replaced by a male officer.  Muldrow did not agree to the voluntary transfer and later was forcibly transferred to another position involving neighborhood patrols.  While the transfer did not create a change in her rank or pay, it required a change in basic duties and in weekend shifts and meant she no longer was entitled to take home an unmarked patrol car at the end of her shifts.  Muldrow brought suit alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.

 

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to transfer or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s…..sex.”  Muldrow’s lawsuit at the trial court level was dismissed on summary judgment grounds in which the court held that, as a matter of law, Muldrow’s allegations were not sufficient to establish a claim under Title VII.  Muldrow’s appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was likewise found legally insufficient as that court held that Muldrow was not able to prove that her transfer did not cause her a “materially significant disadvantage” which the court held was required to prevail on a Title VII claim.

 

Muldrow’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was successful.  The Court reversed the holding of the Eighth Circuit by holding that to make a successful claim a plaintiff need only show that they suffered some harm regarding a term or condition of employment based on sex, and that the harm need not be significant.  The term discrimination, according to the Court simply means that someone has been treated worse. The Court stated that the Eighth Circuit’s “significant harm” standard improperly added language to the Title VII terminology.

 

This decision reveals that a somewhat relaxed standard need only be met for a plaintiff to establish a claim under Title VII on the basis of sex.  Should you have any questions about this case, or wish to discuss how this decision may apply to your situation, please contact our firm.

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